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Printz v. UnitedStates: The Revival of
Constitutional Federalism

I. ITRODUCTION
In 1992, 15,377 Americans were murdered with firearms.' Among them,
12,489 were killed by handguns. z
Between 1988 and 1992, the United States experienced a forty-one percent
surge in gun murders.'
Armed criminals robbed or attacked 530,000 Americans in 199l.'
On average, armed rapists assaulted forty-one American women everyday in
1992.'
The cost of treating firearm injuries in 1990 was estimated to be $1.4 billion.6
The indirect cost of lost productivity as a result of those injuries exceeded $19
billion a year.7
In 1990, handguns killed a total of only eighty-seven people in Japan, sixtyeight in Canada, twenty-two in Great Britain, but over 24,000 in the United States.'
People can be numbed by such an epidemic of violence. On March 30, 1981,
however, an attempted-presidential assassination shocked the American public.9
John Hinckley, Jr. shot White House Press Secretary James Brady in the head with
a .22 caliber handgun and wounded three others, including President Ronald
Reagan.' Even though James Brady miraculously survived the shooting, he

1. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR
THE UNITED STATES 18 (1992).

2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 371 (1992).

5. See id. at 292.
6. See Wendy Max & Dorothy P. Rice, Shooting in the Dark: Estimating the Cost of Firearm
Injuries, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1993.
7. See id.
8. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR
THE UNITED STATES (1990). The figures include murders, suicides, and accidents. See id.
9. See Marie Cocco, ForJames Brady,A Trip Back to Terror, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 1989, at 2.
10. See id.

became permanently paralyzed." Outraged by the fact that Hinckley, who had a
history of mental illness, freely obtained a firearm,'2 James Brady and his wife
started to campaign for stricter gun control despite fervent opposition from the
National Rifle Association.' 3
On November 30, 1993, Congress enacted the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act (the Brady Act)' 4 as an amendment to the Gun Control Act of
1968." The Brady Act requires that, until the Department of Justice develops a
national computerized background check system, the chief law enforcement officer
of a prospective gun purchaser's place of residence shall perform a background
check within a five-day waiting period. 6 Soon after the Brady Act took effect,
seven United States District Courts heard arguments on the constitutionality of the
statute. 7 Five of these courts ruled that the background-check provision violated

11. See David S. Broder, Jim and Sarah Brady: A Thumbs-Up Couple, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov.
9, 1987, at 1IA; Wayne King, Sarah and James Brady, Target: The Gun Lobby, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 44.
12. See David Behrens, 10 Years of Survival, NEWSDAY, Mar. 5, 1991, at 48. Using a false
address, "Hinckley bought [a] .22-cal[iber] RG 14 Rohm revolver for $29 [from] a Texas pawn shop."
See id. He was under psychiatric care at that time. See Ron Shaffer & Neil Henry, Hinckley Pursued
Actressfor Months, Letter Shows, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1981, at A8. Hinckley had been ousted from
a neo-Nazi organization whose leaders deemed him "too violent." See id. At trial, Hinckley was found
insane and committed to a mental institution. See Laura A. Kiernan, A Hinckley Interview: 'I Thought
for Sure I Would be Convicted,' WASH. POST, June 29, 1982, at Al.
13. See Naftali Bendavid, Handgun Control Group Reloads, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 20, 1993, at 1;
Linda M. Harrington, Gun Fighters,Jim and SarahBrady May FinallyWin the Battlefor the Bill That
Bears TheirName, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1993, at 1. For discussions on gun control legislation, see Bob
Dole, The BradyBill: It's JustNot Enough, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1993-94, at 135; Andrew
Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 53 (1992); Marc Christopher
Cozzolino, Note, Gun Control: The Brady Handgun Violence PreventionAct, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 245 (1992).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994).
15. Id. §§ 921-930. The Gun Control Act of 1968, enacted "after the shooting deaths of Rev.
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Sen. Robert F. Kennedy," is the nation's principal gun control law. See
Pierre Thomas, Hit-or-MissControl of FirearmsSales: EnforcersCan'tKeep Up with Dealers,WASH.
POST, Nov. 29, 1992, at At. The statute makes it illegal to sell firearm or ammunition to a person if
the seller "know[s] or [has] reasonable cause to believe" that the person is a felon, fugitive, drug addict,
illegal alien, one who is mentally defective, one who has been convicted of domestic violence, one who
has been dishonorably "discharged from the Armed Forces," or one who has renounced his or her
citizenship. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2).
17. See Frye v. United States, 916 F. Supp. 546 (M.D.N.C. 1995), overruledby Printz v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076 (W.D. La. 1994); McGee
v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994), aff'd sub nom., Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d
452 (5th Cir. 1996); Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 78 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1996), 129 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 1997); Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp.
1372 (D. Ariz. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom.,
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont.
1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995),
rev'd sub nom., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp.
1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996).
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the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.'
In Printz v. United States, 9 the United States Supreme Court considered the
Tenth Amendment challenges to the Brady Act, and held that the backgroundcheck provision impermissibly infringed upon the sovereignty of the States because
it compelled state officials to administer a federal-regulatory program.2 °
This Note examines the constitutionality of the Brady Act's background-check
provision by critically analyzing the Supreme Court's reasoning in Printz and its
previous interpretations of the Tenth Amendment. Part II of this Note reviews the
historical developments of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the Tenth
Amendment area.2' Part III provides the facts of Printz and the pertinent
provisions of the Brady Act.22 Part IV analyzes the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in Printz.23 Part V demonstrates the ruling's immediate effects
and far-reaching impact.24 Part VI concludes with a summation of Printz'sholding
and its significance.25
H1. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT
As one federal court recently observed: "Supreme Court decisions about the
Tenth Amendment do not reflect a pattern of straight line development of a theme.
Rather the cases seem to reflect a series of shifting perspectives on the nature and
breadth of the powers reserved to the states ...
A.

Early Developments
Commentators appear to agree that the Tenth Amendment is merely

18. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X. Frye and Koog were the only two cases where the district courts found the
background-check provision of the Brady Act constitutional. See Frye,916 F. Supp. at 549; Koog, 852
F. Supp. at 1388.
19. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
20. See id. at 2384.
21. See infra notes 26-91 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 92-112 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 113-59 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 160-215 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
26. Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev 'd,79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir.
1996). For a critical discussion of the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, see Richard
E. Levy, New York v. United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent,History, and
Policy in Determiningthe Scope of FederalPower, 41 U. KAN. L. Rev. 493 (1993).
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"declaratory of the division of powers between nation and states,"27 and "probably
reaffirm[s] the centralizing tendencies of the new [federal] system."2 Early
Supreme Court cases, however, judicially amended the plain language of the Tenth
Amendment, limiting federal powers to only those "expressly delegated to the
national government." 9
During the New Deal era, federal power exploded in response to the economic
emergencies.3 ° In 1937, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court upheld the
National Labor Relations Act31 in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 2 In
subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court generally deferred to Congress and
upheld expansive federal regulations, finding that the Tenth Amendment "states but
a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."33

B.

National League of Cities v. Usery: A Test for State Immunity

The Supreme Court's modem jurisprudence in this area continued, in the
Court's own words, on "an unsteady path."34
The path began in 1976 when the Court, in National League of Cities v.
Usery,35 considered whether an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938,36 imposing minimum wage and maximum hour requirements upon state and
local governments, was a valid exercise of commerce power. 37 In a close decision,
the Court invalidated the provision, holding that it impermissibly interfered with

27. See WALTER BERNS, The Meaning of the Tenth Amendment, in "GOVERNMENT FROM
REFLECTION AND CHOICE": ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONALLAW 162, 162 (Gary
L. McDowell ed., 1981).
28. CHARLES A. LOFGREN, The Origins of the Tenth Amendment, in "GOvERNMENT FROM
REFLECTION AND CHOICE": CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND FEDERALISM

70, 111 (1986).
29. See Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868) (emphasis added). The Court quoted and
reaffirmed this language in the famous case of Hammer v. Dagenhart,247 U.S. 251, 275 (1918),
overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The Tenth Amendment does not
contain the word "expressly." See U.S. CONST. amend. X; 18 U.S.C. § 922(S)(2) (1994).
30. See Levy, supra note 26, at 495; see also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121-28
( lIth ed. 1985).
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
32. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
33. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act
which imposed minimum wage requirements).
34. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992).
35. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruledby Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
37. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 836-37. The Constitution provides that Congress
shall have power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
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traditional governmental functions of the States and their political subdivisions. 8
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated that "there are attributes of
sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by
Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative
authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from
exercising the authority in that manner."39 The majority recognized, however, that
"temporary enactments tailored to combat a national emergency" were
permissible.'
Justice Brennan strongly dissented, noting that "nothing in the Tenth
Amendment constitute[d] a limitation" when Congress acted within its delegated
powers.4' He further argued that external restrictions on congressional power
rested, not in the judicial process, but the political process.42
Five years later, the Supreme Court refined the holding of NationalLeague of
Cities in Hodel v. VirginiaSurface Mining & ReclamationAss 'n."3 In this case, the
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 (the Surface Mining Act),' 4 which required states to
enforce "compliance with the full panoply of federal performance standards." 45
The Court developed a three-prong test for invalidating congressional
legislation on Tenth Amendment grounds as follows: (1) the challenged statute
must regulate the "States as States"; (2) the legislation must address an indisputable
"attribute of state sovereignty"; and (3) the States' compliance must directly impair
"their ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions." ' A footnote to the majority opinion further indicated that, even if the
three requirements were met, a strong federal interest might nonetheless justify a
federal intrusion. 4

38. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851-52. National League of Cities expressly
overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). See id. at 855. In Wirtz, the Court held that federal
minimum wage standards could be applied to local schools and hospitals. See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 19394.
39. Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
40. See id. at 853.
41. See id. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 857-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
44. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988). The statute sets federal mining standards designed to
promote safety and preserve the environment. See id.
45. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 269.
46. See id. at 287-88 (quoting Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845-54 (1976)).
47. See id. at 288 n.29.
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Employing this analysis, the Court found the Surface Mining Act to be a valid
exercise of commerce power because it did not regulate the "States as States,"
rather it targeted individual business."
In 1982, the Supreme Court considered another Tenth Amendment challenge
in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi.9 In response to a
national energy crisis, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA)5° required state utility commissions to consider federal rate-making
standards and procedures and imposed specific reporting requirements.5 1 The State
of Mississippi challenged PURPA as beyond the scope of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause.52 The Court upheld the constitutionality of PURPA,
finding that the statute presented the States with a choice between compliance and
preemption, rather than "'directly compelling' the States to enact" legislation or
threatening their sovereignty. 3
In dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the Hodel three-prong test would have
invalidated the challenged provisions of PURPA 4 Returning to the principles of
National League of Cities, the dissent laid a foundation for the later significant
ruling in New York v. United States.55
The Tenth Amendment and the congressional exercise of commerce power
were once again before the Court in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v. Wyoming.56 In this case, Congress amended the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 7 extending prohibition on age discrimination
to state and local governments.58 Equal Employment OpportunityCommission and
NationalLeague of Cities had similar facts, but the Court narrowly distinguished
them.59
A five-member majority conceded that ADEA regulated the "States as States,"
but found the federal intrusion here was "sufficiently less serious than... [that in]
National League of Cities so as to make it unnecessary... to override Congress'
express choice to extend its regulatory authority to the States."6 Echoing the
dissenting Justices in National League of Cities, Justice Stevens stated in a
concurring opinion that nothing in the Tenth Amendment warranted a judicial

48. See id. at 293.

49. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 3201 (1976 & Supp. IV); 16 U.S.C. § 2611 (1976 & Supp. IV).
51. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 746-49.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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See id. at 752.
See id. at 765.
See id. at 778-79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
505 U.S. 144 (1992). Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in the case. See id.
460 U.S. 226 (1983).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1992).
See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 460 U.S. at 228-29.
See id. at 237-39.
See id. at 239.
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limitation on congressional power delegated by the Commerce Clause.61
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission restricted the application of
National League of Cities and hinted its reversal.62

C. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Political
Process Protects State Sovereignty
In the 1985 case of Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,63
the constitutionality of extending the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local
governments came before the Supreme Court for the second time. ' This time, the
Court expressly overruled NationalLeague of Cities.65
Finding that requiring the states to apply the federal statute to state employees
did not infringe upon state sovereignty,' the Court rejected the holding of National
League of Cities as "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice."67 The
Court declared that "the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special
restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of
the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of
federal authority."68 Thus, the GarciaCourt agreed with the dissent in National
League of Cities that the limits on congressional power lay in the political process,
rather than the judicial process.69
Justice O'Connor firmly maintained in her dissenting opinion that the political
process was ineffective in restraining expansive federal regulations, and firmly
maintained that it was the Court's duty to resolve the conflict between federalism

61. See id.at 248 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
862 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
62. See Levy, supra note 26, at 497.
63. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
64. See id.at 533; see also supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (discussing NationalLeague
of Cities).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 554.
67. Id. at 546-47 (overruling "a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a
judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional"').
68. Id. at 552.
69. See id.; Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 862 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also Jesse H.
Choper, The Scope of NationalPower Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensabilityof JudicialReview, 86
YALE L.J. 1552, 1557 (1977) (arguing that the issue of whether the federal government infringed upon
state sovereignty should be "nonjusticiable, with [the] final resolution left to the political branches").
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and commerce power." Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Rehnquist claimed
that, one day, the Court would resume this duty. 7'
In South Carolinav. Baker,72 the Court followed the reasoning in Garcia.734
Baker involved the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),
which removed the federal income tax exemption for interests earned on bonds
issued in unregistered form by state and local governments. 75 The State of South
Carolina brought an original jurisdiction suit in the Supreme Court, contending that
TEFRA violated the Tenth Amendment by compelling the states to issue only
registered bonds.76
Writing the majority opinion, Justice Brennan stated that the political process

was the states' principal protection against congressional overreach.77 South
.Carolina's allegation that TEFRA was passed by "an uninformed Congress relying
upon incomplete information" failed to establish a defect in the national political
process.7" Because TEFRA did not deprive South Carolina of the right to
participate in the political process, the Court upheld the statute's constitutionality! 9
Some scholars read Garcia as an indication that the Supreme Court would no
longer strike down federal law on the Tenth Amendment ground."0 The tide,

however,, was once again reversed by the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in New
York v. United States.81

70. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 584, 587-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that a number of
changes in congressional operations, such as the direct election of Senators under the Seventeenth
Amendment and the expanded influence of national interest groups, "lessened the weight Congress
gives to the legitimate interests of States as States").
71. See id.at 589. The claim became a reality in 1992, when Justice O'Connor wrote the majority
opinion in New York v. United States and reclaimed the Tenth Amendment. See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
72. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
73. See id. at 512-13.
74. 26 U.S.C. § 1030)(1) (1982).
75. See id; see also Baker, 485 U.S. at 507-08. The unregistered bonds were vehicles for tax
evasion and other illegal activities. See Hearingson H.R. 6300 Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1982) (testimony of John Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of Treasury
for Tax Policy).
76. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 508.
77. Seeid. at513.
78. See id. at 512-13 (quoting South Carolina's brief). The Court appointed a Special Master to
conduct fact-finding hearings. See id. at 510-11. South Carolina filed exceptions to the factual findings
submitted by the Special Master. See id. at 511.
79. See id. at 527.
80. See 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURES § 4.10, at 310 (1986 & Supp. 1991).

81.

505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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D. New York v. United States: Reviving the Tenth Amendment
New Yorkv. UnitedStates examined the validity of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (the Waste Policy Act).82 The Waste
Policy Act contained three provisions to encourage the states' compliance with the
federal regulation which are as follows: (1) a monetary incentive for states meeting
certain deadlines;83 (2) an access incentive allowing a host state to collect escalated
surcharges and to deny access to exporting states who did not meet deadlines;" and
(3) a take-title provision requiring states that do not enact the Waste Policy Act to
take full liability for all the waste within their borders. 5
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor found the monetary and access
incentives to be valid exercises of commerce power.86 She reasoned that Congress
could encourage the states to act by allowing the states to choose between
regulation and federal preemption. 87 The opinion, however, invalidated the taketitle provision, because, even though this provision allowed the states to choose
between enacting the Waste Policy Act and accepting liability for radioactive
waste, both choices were "unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques." 8
The Court declared that "Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program. '
By revitalizing the Tenth Amendment, the Supreme Court affirmed that
congressional power under the Commerce Clause has limits.' Nonetheless, how
the Tenth Amendment would impact other manners in which Congress would
exercise its commerce power was still unclear.9'

82. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-2021(j) (1988). To end a crisis in the disposal of radioactive waste, the
Waste Policy Act provided that "[e]ach State shall be responsible for providing.., for the disposal of
...low-level radioactive waste generated within the State." See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(a)(1) (1994). The
statute also authorized the states to establish and operate regional disposal facilities, and to set a
timetable for restricting access to existing disposal sites. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(e)(d)(2) (1988).
84. See id § 2021(e)(e)(2).
85. See id. § 2021(e)(d)(2)(C); New York, 505 U.S. at 174-75.
86. See New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74.
87. See id. at 177.
88. See id. at 176.
89. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,288
(1981)).
90. See id. at 156.
91. See generally Ronald A. Giller, Note, FederalGun Control in the United States: Revival of
the Tenth Amendment, 10 ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGALCOMMENT. 151,162 (1994) ("Courts reviewing federal

gun control laws have interpreted these and other Supreme Court cases differently ....).
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1H. THE BRADY ACT AND THE FACTS OF THE CASE
The Brady Act requires the Department of Justice to develop a national instant
background check system within five years of its enactment.92 In the meantime, the
Brady Act sets a five-business -day waiting period for proposed sales of handguns.93
Firearm dealers must examine a potential gun buyer's identification,94 require the
buyer to make a sworn statement vouching his or her eligibility on a form known
as "the Brady Form,"95 and forward a copy of the form to the chief law
enforcement officer of the prospective buyer's place of residence.9 6 A chief law
enforcement officer is defined as "the chief of police, the sheriff, or an equivalent
officer or the designee of any such individual." 97
Unless the state government already has an instant background check system,98
or the state issued a handgun permit to the prospective buyer after a background
check, 99 the chief law enforcement officer must "make a reasonable effort to
ascertain within 5 business days [whether the proposed handgun sale would violate
of the law,] including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems
... and in a national system designated by the Attorney General.""
The chief law enforcement officer has the power to waive the waiting period
by notifying the gun dealer that there is no basis for denying the sale. 0' If the chief
law enforcement officer finds that the proposed gun sale would be illegal and
notifies the dealer, the officer must, within twenty days of a request by the
prospective buyer, provide written reasons for denial. 0 2 If the chief law
enforcement officer approves the transaction, the Brady Form must be destroyed
within twenty days after the sale.'0 3
The Brady Act is part of the Gun Control Act, which provides that one who
"knowingly violates [the statute] ... shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for
no more than one year, or both."" However, the Brady Act exempts chief law
enforcement officers from civil liability "for failure to prevent the sale or transfer
of a handgun to a person whose receipt or possession of the handgun is unlawful,"
and "for preventing such a sale or transfer to a person who may lawfully receive

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (1994).
See id. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(1).
See id § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(I.
See id. § 922(s)(3).
See id. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(m)-(IV).
See id. § 922(s)(8).
See id. § 922(s)(1)(D).
See id. § 922(s)(1)(C).
Id. § 922(s)(2).
See id. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii).
See id. § 922(s)(6)(C).
See id. § 922(s)(6)(B)(1).
See id. § 924(a)(5).
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or possess a handgun."' 5
Petitioners Jay Printz and Richard Mack, sheriffs of Ravalli County, Montana,
and Graham County, Arizona, respectively, were chief law enforcement officers
under the Brady Act."° In 1994, Petitioners filed separate suits in two United
States district courts, both seeking declaratory judgements that the interim
provisions of the Brady Act requiring them to check prospective gun buyers'
backgrounds and to perform related duties were unconstitutional. 7 They alleged
that the interim provisions would require the use of already scarce personnel and
financial resources available to them so as to interfere with the fulfillment of their
duties under state laws. 08
The district courts in Montana and Arizona both held as follows: (1) the
sheriffs had standing to contest the constitutionality of the Brady Act; ° and (2) the
interim provisions of the Act violated the Tenth Amendment, but were severable
from other provisions of the Brady Act."' On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the two cases and reversed, holding that
the Brady Act's interim provisions did not violate the Tenth Amendment."' The
United States Supreme Court granted the Petitioners' writ of certiorari in 1996.'12
IV.

A.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The Majority Ruling
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court." 3 After a review of federal

105. See id. § 922(s)(7)(A)-(B).
106. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2369 (1997); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(8)
(defining chief law enforcement officer).
107. See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Ariz. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part,66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997);
Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1506 (D. Mont. 1994), affid in partand rev'd in part sub
nom., Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'dsub nom., Printz v. United States, 117
S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
108. See Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1375; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1507. For a discussion on reactions
to the Brady Act, see Richard E. Gardiner & Stephon P. Halbrook, NRA and Law Enforcement
Opposition to the Brady Act: From Congress to the District Courts, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 13 (1994) (discussing burden imposed on law enforcement officers by the Brady Act).
109. See Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1378; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1509.
110. See Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1383-84; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1519-20.
111. See Mack, 66 F.3d at 1034.
112. See Printz v. United States, 116 U.S. at 2521 (1996).
113. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2368-84 (1997). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy
joined in the judgement. See id. at 2368.

laws regulating the distribution of firearms," 4 Justice Scalia began his analysis of
whether compelled enlistment of state and local executive officials for the
implementation of federal laws was constitutional. 1 5 Concluding that no text in the
Constitution spoke directly to the question before the Court, Justice Scalia sought
answers "in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the
Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.""' 6
First, Justice Scalia discovered no evidence in historical constitutional practice
indicating the existence of a congressional power to compel a state's executive
branch into federal service." 7 Rejecting the Government's argument that early
congressional enactments implied such a power, Justice Scalia found instead that
those early laws only allowed the federal government to impose duties upon state
judges to enforce appropriate judicial matters. 8 Justice Scalia also found that the
Government's reliance on portions of The Federalist,which suggested that the
federal government could employ state officials to execute federal laws, was
unpersuasive." 9 He reasoned that those statements did not indicate Congress
could, without the states' consent, impose duties on the states. 20 Turning his
attention to the nation's more recent history, Justice Scalia noted a continued
absence of "executive-commandeering" laws until very recent years and regarded
the two centuries of congressional avoidance of such legislation as illuminative.' 2'
Second, Justice Scalia observed that the structure of the Constitution reflected
a principle of "dual sovereignty." ' He explained that the Framers designed a
political structure where both federal and state governments exercise authority,
instead of a central government "act[ing] upon and through the States."'2
Therefore, if state officials could be pressed into federal services at no cost to the
federal government, federal power would be impermissibly expanded.' 24

114. See id. at 2368-69. The opinion reviewed the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-30
(1994), and the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994). See id.
115. See id. at 2369-70.
116. See id. at 2370.
117. See id. at2370-76.
118. Seeid. at2371.
119. See id. at2371-73 (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 27,36 (Alexander Hamilton) No.45 (James
Madison)).
120. See id.; see also Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 796 n.35
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding the claims in The Federalist
rested on the natural assumption that the states would consent).
121. See Printz, 117 S.Ct. at2375-76.
122. See id. at2376 (citing Gregory v.Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,457 (1991) (recognizing the dual
sovereignty established by the Constitution)). For a discussion on the preservation of state sovereignty,
see Vince Lee Farhat, Term Limits and the Tenth Amendment: The PopularSovereignty Model of
Reserved Powers, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1163 (1996).
123. See Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2377.
124. See id. at 2378. But see Patricia T. Northrop, Note, The Constitutional Insignificance of
Fundingfor FederalMandates, 46 DuKE L.J. 903, 903-30 (1997) (advocating that courts should not
consider lack of federal funding in determining the constitutionality of federal mandates imposed upon
states).
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Third, Justice Scalia pointed out that using state officials for federal
governance would have adverse effects upon the balance of power between the
three branches of the federal government.' 25 He observed that the Brady Act
practically put the responsibility of administering a federal regulatory program
upon state and local officials, while the Constitution clearly designated the
President and officers of the President as the ones who should bear that
responsibility.' 26 Justice Scalia. warned that a law like the Brady Act would
effectively reduce the power of the President and destroy the unity of the Federal
Executive.'27
Next, Justice Scalia rejected the dissent's theory that the Brady Act was
constitutionally valid as a law "necessary and proper" for congressional exercise
of the Commerce Clause power. 2 ' He reasoned that where a law violated the
principle of dual sovereignty, it could not be a law "'proper for carrying into
[e]xecution the Commerce Clause,"' because the Commerce Clause did not allow
29
Congress to regulate "'state goverments' regulation of interstate commerce."
Finally, the majority examined the most important factor in reaching its
decision-the Court's own jurisprudence. 3 ' Justice Scalia rejected the dissent's
four attempts to distinguish the Brady Act from the Waste Policy Act invalidated
in New York as follows: (1) the Waste Policy Act was not distinguishable on the
ground that it involved policy-making decisions while the Brady Act did not
because "[e]xecutive action that has utterly no policy-making component is rare"; 131
(2) even though the state and local officials only perform ministerial tasks under
the Brady Act, they would still have to take the blame for the defects in a federal
regulatory program; 132 (3) although the Waste Policy Act addressed the states, and
the Brady Act addressed individuals, the Brady Act directed individuals in their

125. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
126. See id. The Constitution mandates that the president "shall take Care that the Laws [of the
United States] be faithfully executed." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
127. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
128. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; supranote 37. The Necessary and Proper Clause
grants Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Id. cl. 18.
129. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992));
see also Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of FederalPower: A Jurisdictional
Interpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 297-326, 33.0-33 (1993).
130. See Printz 117 S. Ct. at 2379-84.
131. See id. at 2381 (stating that leaving no policy-making discretion to the states would worsen
the federal intrusion).
132. See id. at 2382 (finding that Congress could take credit for solving the problem without paying
for the program's implementation, while the states might take the blame for the program's possible
errors).

official capacities as agents of the states;' 33 and (4) a balancing of interests
approach was inappropriate in the present case, because a comparative
assessment
34
could not overcome fundamental defects in the Brady Act. 1
For the above reasons, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and
invalidated the provisions of the Brady Act that required state officials to conduct
background checks of potential handgun buyers.'35 The Court did not consider the
constitutionality of other provisions that imposed
duties upon firearm dealers,
36
because no firearm dealer was before the Court. 1
B. The Concurrences
1. Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority, 137 writing separately only to38
emphasize that the Court's holding did not totally destroy the Brady Act.
Specifically, Justice O'Connor observed that the state and local law enforcement
officers could still voluntarily perform background checks of handgun purchasers,
and that Congress 39
could ask the states to participate in the regulatory scheme on a
contractual basis. 1
2.

Justice Thomas

Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgement."4 Justice
Thomas stressed the notion that the federal government could act "only where the
Constitution authorizes it to do so.''. He stated that because Congress did not
have the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate what he considered
"intrastate" transfers of firearms, Congress could not
have the consequent power
4
to compel state officials to enforce the regulation. 1

133. See id.
134. See id.at 2383 (finding the whole object of the Brady Act was to compromise the structure of
dual sovereignty).
135. See id. at 2384.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138. See id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
139. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing 23 U.S.C. § 402 which conditioned states' receipt
of federal highway funds on compliance with certain federal requirements).
140. See id. at 2385-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
141. See id. at 2385 (Thomas, J., concurring).
142. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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C. The Dissents

1. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer, filed a
dissenting opinion.1 3 Justice Stevens first maintained that there were sufficient
bases in the text of the Constitution to find the Brady Act valid. 1' According to
Justice Stevens, the regulation of firearm sales fell within the congressional power
'
under the Commerce Clause together with the Necessary and Proper Clause. 45
Because the Tenth Amendment did not restrict the methods of exercising such a
delegated power, the federal government could require state officials to administer
its laws.' 46 Next, Justice Stevens argued that historical practices suggested that the
Framers allowed the federal government to extend its capacity by acting through
the states.' 47 He analogized the challenged provisions of the Brady Act to the
drafting and financing of the Confederate Army through the states,'48 the federal
tax collection by state agents in the nation's early years,' 49 and the early federal

laws requiring state judges to process citizenship applications. 5 ' Justice Stevens
also disagreed with the majority's analysis of dual sovereignty.'' While conceding
the existence of such a principle, he explained that preserving state sovereignty was
irrelevant to the question of whether the federal government could require
individual state employees to perform certain duties.'52 Finally, Justice Stevens
distinguished New York, the precedent heavily relied upon by the majority.' 53 He
argued that the Brady Act addressed individual law enforcement officers, while the
statute invalidated in New York directed the state as entities. 154

143.
144.
145.
128.
146.
note 18.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See id. at 2386-2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 18; supranotes 37 and
See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X; supra
See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2390 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2397-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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2. Justice Souter
Justice Souter wrote a brief dissenting opinion.'55 While joining in Justice
Stevens's dissent, Justice Souter pointed out that, to him, selected readings of The
Federalistwere more persuasive than the numerous examples of states executing
federal regulatory programs.156

3.

Justice Breyer

Justice Breyer filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stevens
joined.'57 Justice Breyer examined the federal systems of Switzerland, Germany,
and the European Union. 5 He contended that, from a practical standpoint, the
states' implementation of federal laws would be a better alternative than the
creation of more federal bureaucracies, and could better promote both state
59
sovereignty and individual liberty. 1
V. IMPACT
The impact of the Supreme Court's ruling in Printz is two-fold. First, it
eliminated the mandatory background checks of prospective handgun purchasers
until November 30, 1998, when the Attorney General was expected to establish a
national instant background check system."6 This effect is likely to prompt
amendments of the Brady Act by Congress.' 6' Second, after the invalidation of the
Brady Act's interim provisions, other executive-commandeering federal statutes are
also subject to the same scrutiny.'62

A. Impact on the Brady Act
1. Immediate judicial and societal effects
By invalidating the Brady Act's interim background-check provisions, Printz

155. See id. at 2401-04 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 2404-05 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
158. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally Cliona J.M. Kimber, A Comparison of
EnvironmentalFederalism in the United Statesand the European Union, 54 MD. L. REV. 1658 (1995)
(comparing the legal structures of the United States and the European Union).
159. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2404-05 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1) (1994).
161. See infra notes 173-87 and accompanying text (discussing likely amendments to the Brady
Act).
162. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376; see also infra notes 188-215 and accompanying text (discussing
the vulnerability of executive-commandeering statues to Tenth Amendment invalidation).
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overruled the lower courts that upheld the Brady Act 163 and effectively nullified the
urgent intent of Congress to control the distribution of handguns."6 However, the
Supreme Court's holding in Printzdid not necessarily make it easier for convicted
felons and other ineligible persons to purchase handguns.' 65 First, the Court
refused to consider the validity of the duties imposed on firearm dealers by the
Brady Act without the presence of any firearm dealer or purchaser before the
Court. " Therefore, firearm dealers remain obligated to send Brady Forms to chief
law enforcement officers, regardless of whether such officers would accept the
forms, and to wait for five business days before making a sale. Second, as pointed
out by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion, the states and chief law
67
enforcement officers could still voluntarily conduct background checks.' There
is a general expectation that most law enforcement agencies will do so because
every major police organization supported the passage of the Brady Act. " Finally,
even without the federal regulatory program, twenty-three states already passed
some legislation restricting the sale of firearms. 69 Among them, thirteen states
70
have waiting periods ranging from forty-eight hours to fifteen days; ten states
7
require a permit to purchase a handgun;. ' and two states require a telephone

163. See supranotes 17-18 (listing the lower courts which upheld the Brady Act).
164. See Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2384.
165.

See Dennis A. Henigan, N.R.A. Should Not Rejoice: Brady Act Lives On, NAT'L L.J., July 28,

1997, at 17 (predicting that Printz would have little impact on gun control because the five-day waiting
period and the rest of the Brady Act remained intact). But see Stephen P. Halbrook, 'Printz' Will Have
Aug. 18, 1997, at 18 (asserting that the waiting-period
Effect on U.S. Gun Legislation, NAT'L L.J.,
requirement had no force after the Supreme Court struck down the background-check provision).
166. See Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2384. The Court explained that "[tihese provisions burden[ed] only
firearm dealers and purchasers, and no plaintiff in either of those categories is before us here." Id. Thus
the Court declined "to speculate regarding the rights and obligations of parties not before the Court."
Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186-87 (1992)).
167. See id. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
168. See Henigan, supranote 165, at 17 (noting the widespread support of the Brady Act from the
law enforcement community).
169. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-344, at 23 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984 (estimating
the costs that state and local governments would incur under the Brady Act).
170. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-77 (1994) (48 hours); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12071 (West Supp.
1998) (15 days); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-37(a) (West Supp. 1998) (two weeks); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 790.065 (West Supp. 1998) (three days); MD.CODE ANN. art. 27, § 442 (1996) (seven days); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 624.7132 (West Supp. 1998) (seven days); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.420 (1993) (15 days);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6111 (West 1983) (48 hours); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-35 (Supp. 1997)
(seven days); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-7-9 (Michie 1988) (48 hours); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-17-1316 (1997) (15 days); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.090 (West 1998) (five days); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 175.35 (West Supp. 1996) (48 hours subject to a three-day extension).
171. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-2 (1993); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2 (West 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-47-2-1 (Michie 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.15 (West 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN.ch. 140, § 129C (West Supp. 1998); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.422 (West Supp. 1998); Mo.

background check.'72 Consequently, the Printz ruling's adverse effect on gun
control is likely to be most noticeable in the twenty states that neither require
background check of gun purchasers, nor allow local officials to get involved in
handgun transactions.' 73
2.

Possible amendments of the Brady Act

Although the Supreme Court struck down the Brady Act's background-check
provision, some amendments may achieve the congressional intent to immediately
regulate handgun distribution and, at the same time, satisfy the constitutional
requirements of the current Court.'74
a.

A FederalGun Control Agency

Because the Court found compelled enlistment of state and local officials in
federal regulatory schemes unconstitutional, Congress could create a federal
agency or require existing federal agencies in each state to carry out the tasks of
conducting background checks until the establishment of a nationwide
computerized system. '
However, such an operation would be costly and inefficient, as the responsible
federal agency would need to go to individual state and local law enforcement
agencies to research in unfamiliar recordkeeping systems.' 76 The problem is
especially conspicuous in rural areas where a background check by "reasonable
effort" under the Brady Act 77 may simply mean relying on a local sheriffs
personal knowledge of the gun purchaser.'78 Most importantly, as Justice Breyer
questioned in his dissenting opinion, "[w]hy, or how, would what the majority sees
as a constitutional alternative - the creation of a new federal gun-law bureaucracy,
or the expansion of an existing federal bureaucracy - better promote either state
sovereignty or individual liberty?"' 79

ANN. STAT. § 571.090 (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3 (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
400.00 (McKinney Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-402 (1993).
172. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448A (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2 (Michie 1996).
173. See Halbrook, supra note 165, at 18 (discussing Printz as applied to states not requiring
background checks for the purchase of guns).

174. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2385 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that there are constitutionally permissible ways to implement federal policies).
175.
176.

See id. at 2384 (holding Congress could not directly conscript state officers).
The Brady Act called for "research in... State and local recordkeeping systems." 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(s)(2) (1994).
177.

Id.

178.

See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

OPEN LETI'ER TO STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS (Jan. 21, 1994)
(interpreting the meaning of "reasonable effort" under the Brady Act).
179. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2405 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Inducing the States' Participation

A more practical approach, as suggested by Justice O'Connor, is "to amend the
interim program [of the Brady Act] to provide for its continuance on a contractual
basis with the States . . .as [Congress] does with a number of other federal
programs."' 0 Congress can exercise its taxing and spending powers to enact
incentive measures urging the States, without forcing them, to implement federal
programs.'' Such incentives may include special awards, a progressive schedule
of reimbursement based on the number of background checks performed by the
state, and the withholding of federal funding from states that do not implement the
federal program.1 2 Under this approach, the federal government could achieve its
goals through its spending power and cooperative federalism, thus avoiding
constitutional problems under the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence." 3

c.

Regulating FirearmDealers Directly

To accomplish the original goal of the Brady Act, Congress may also amend
the Act to directly regulate individuals without mandatory assistance from the
states.'" This type of regulation would not implicate the Tenth Amendment
because enforcement of the federal law would require no state resource, unless a
state chooses to participate in the program, and Congress would remain publicly
accountable for the regulation."i 5

180. See id. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing 23 U.S.C. § 402 which conditions States'
receipt of federal funds for highway safety program on compliance with federal requirements); accord
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,204-12 (1987) (holding federal government could withhold federal
highway funds if the state fails to adopt federal minimum drinking age requirement).
181. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (finding Congress may attach
conditions to receipt of federal funds by the states if such condition bear some relationship to the federal
purpose).
182. See id. at 171-74 (upholding the monetary and access incentives contained in the Waste Policy
Act that provided for a surcharge to be distributed to states complying with the federal regulation).
183. For a general discussion on the interplay of federal funding and state sovereignty, see Lewis
B. Kaden, Politics,Money, andState Sovereignty: The JudicialRole, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979).
184. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161-66 (reviewing constitutional history and finding that Congress
should exercise its legislative authority directly over individuals rather than over the states); see also
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 779 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and.dissenting in part) (stating that the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act impermissibly
attempts to regulate states as states rather than as individual companies); Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 293 (1981) (upheld the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act which targeted individual businesses rather than the states).
185. See supra note 184.
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The amended Act could place the obligation to conduct background checks
directly upon firearm dealers instead of state and local officials. The states would
then have several choices including providing background checks to firearm dealers
for a charge,18 6 conducting gratuitous background checks, or doing nothing and
letting the firearm dealers hire private background-check companies.' 87

B. Impact Beyond the Brady Act
1. Executive-commandeering legislative enactments are vulnerable to
Tenth Amendment challenges
The significance of finding the Brady Act unconstitutional extends far beyond
the realm of the Brady Act itself. It could lead to the invalidation of other federal
statutes that require state and local officials' participation. Is8 When rejecting the

federal government's contention that a series of statutes could fall following the
Brady Act as irrelevant to the precise issue in Printz, Justice Scalia suggested that
the Court would be interested in looking at those laws "if and when their validity
is challenged in a proper case."' 89

186. See, e.g., COLO.REv. STAT. § 12-26.5-107 (Supp. 1994) (charging a fee for each background
check required by state law); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-526 (Supp. 1997) (requiring all firearm dealers
to collect $7.50 for every criminal background check required by state law); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-308.2:2(J) (Michie Supp. 1998) ("All licensed firearms dealers shall collect a fee of two dollars
for every transaction for which a criminal history record information check is required [by state law].").
187. See Susan R. Miller, More Background Checks in Store for Health Care Workers, S. FLA.
Bus. J., Aug. 11, 1995, at B2 (private companies responding to the increased demand for background
checks); Stuart Silverstein, Applicants: Past May Haunt You, L.A. TIMES, March 7, 1995, at Al
(reviewing the prospering business of background checks); Stuart Silverstein, Background Checking
is a Threat to Fairness,THE PLAIN DEALER, April 9, 1995, at 21 (examining the rise of private
businesses conducting background checks).
188. See Brief for Respondents at 31, Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (Nos.95-1478,
95-1503) (listing federal legislation that could be implicated by an adverse ruling on the Brady Act).
Federal statutes that command state officials to implement federal policies include the following: Fire
Prevention Control Guidelines for Places of Public Accommodation, 15 U.S.C. § 2224 (1994)
(requiring the states to compile and submit a list of places of public accommodation to the federal
government); the Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 620
(1994) (requiring several western states to enact regulations reducing export of unprocessed timber on
public lands); Asbestos Hazards Abatement Program, 20 U.S.C. § 4013 (1994) (requiring state
governors to submit asbestos records to federal agencies); the 1993 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994) (requiring the states to negotiate with Indian tribes regarding gaming
business); the National Voter Registration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. § 1973(gg)-3 (1994) (requiring state
motor vehicle agencies to manage voter registration for federal elections); Regulation of Underground
Storage Tanks, 42 U.S.C. § 6991(a)(c) (1994) (requiring the states to submit inventory data of all
underground storage tanks to the federal government); Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. § 11001 (1994) (requiring the states to establish commissions and plans
to address the problem of hazardous materials).
189. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376 (discussing the fate of federal statutes similar to the Brady Act).
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a.

The Brady Act I

The proposed Brady Act 119 would require the States to enact handgun
registration and to mandate licensing and fingerprinting of handgun owners. 9'
This would be unconstitutional under New York, because Congress could not
"'commandee[r] the legislative process of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program."" 92 The Brady Act II would
also compel local law enforcement officers to administer the tasks, just as the
Brady Act did. 93 This provision would be an impermissible infringement upon
state sovereignty under Printz because the federal government could not directly
conscript state officials." Thus, if Congress enacts the Brady Act II, courts will
strike it down as violative of the Tenth Amendment.

b.

The Driver's Privacy ProtectionAct of 1994

Within three months after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Printz,
two federal district courts invalidated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of
19949' by relying on the reasoning of Printz.'96
Designed to protect motorists' privacy, this federal statute prohibited the states
from disclosing personal information contained in state motor vehicle records.' 97
Finding that Congress impermissibly commanded the states to implement federal
policy by requiring them to regulate the dissemination and use of motor vehicle
records, both district courts easily concluded that the statute violated the Tenth
Amendment.' 98

c.

The National Child Search Assistance Act of 1990

The duties placed on state law enforcement agencies to report traffic fatalities

190. S. 1882, 103d Cong. § 101(a) (1994).
191. See id.
192. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)); see also supra notes 82-89 and
accompanying text.
193. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994); S.1882, § 101(a).
194. See Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2384; see also supra notes 112-36 and accompanying text.
195. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994).
196. See Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358
(W.D. Okla. 1997); Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997).
197. See Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 980-81; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725.
198. See Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety, 994 F. Supp. at 1363-65; Condon, 972
F. Supp. at 982-86.
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and missing children information to various federal authorities could also come
under scrutiny in light of Printz.199 Under the National Child Search Assistance
Act of 1990,200 "[ejach Federal, State, and local law enforcement agency shall
report each case of a missing child under the age of 18 to the national Crime
Information Center of the Department of Justice."2 1 Thus, the statute directly
enlisted state and local officials to implement a federal program in the same manner
as the Brady Act, and will be struck down if properly challenged in court.202
2.

Protection of state rights will not be sweeping

Although Printzclearly pointed lower courts in the direction of protecting state
rights and sovereignty, its effect of overturning executive-commandeering federal
statutes will not be universal.20 3
a.

City of New York v. United States

Three weeks after the Supreme Court decided Printz,the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York summarily dismissed Tenth
Amendment challenges to two federal statutes.2 ° City ofNew York v. UnitedStates
involved several provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996205 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996.206 The statutes provided, in direct conflict with New
York City's ordinance, that no state or local government entity can be prohibited
from sharing information about aliens' immigration status with federal
authorities. 2 7 The court recognized that the provisions displaced New York City's
chosen policy, and that such provisions could compromise city officials' political

199. See Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1387 n.22 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 79 F.3d
452 (5th Cir. 1996).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 5779 (1994).
201. Id.
202. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
203. See, e.g., Deregulation: Attorneys See Restructuring Bills Safe From Constitutional
Challenge, INDUS. ENERGY BULL., July 11, 1997, at 4 (reporting that the utility restructuring bills,
which would require retail electricity competition, would not be found unconstitutional if Congress
drafts the law within the parameters of Printz and New York); see also Richard M. Kuntz, States' Rights
Clash with FederalMandates, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 28, 1997, at 6 (concluding that, if federal
environmental regulations fell within individual states, the Tenth Amendment could not protect the
states from congressional overreach).
204. See City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
205. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1644 (West Supp. 1998) (providing that "[n]ot withstanding any other provision
of Federal, State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or ...restricted
from sending or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States").
206. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1373(a) (West Supp. 1998).
207. See City of New York, 971 F. Supp. at 792-93. The New York City ordinance forbade city
officials and employees from sharing such information with the federal government. See id.
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accountability - a concern raised by the Supreme Court in Printz.2 °s Nevertheless,
the court found the statutes to be constitutional because they did not directly
conscript state and local officials to implement federal immigration policy or
compel the states to regulate immigration. °"
b.

The National Voter RegistrationAct of 1993

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993211 compels state motor vehicle
agencies to manage voter registration in federal elections. 21 ' Even though the
statute requires the states to regulate a federal program and directly conscripts state
officials, it is not vulnerable to Tenth Amendment challenges.212 The Constitution
expressly authorizes Congress to regulate the time, place, and manner of federal
elections. 2 3 Furthermore, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
has the power to implement the guarantees of individual rights and liberties,
including the right to vote.2" 4 Therefore, a constitutional challenge to this statute
will most likely fail.2" 5
VI. CONCLUSION
Furthering the revitalization of the Tenth Amendment started in New York,
Printzstands for the proposition that Congress can not enlist state or local officials
to implement federal policies. 2 6 As the dissenting opinions pointed out, however,
there is no need or reason to find such an absolute principle.2"' It is unnecessary
to read the Brady Act "as permitting the Federal Government to overwhelm a

208. See id. at 795-97.
209. See id. at 797 (declaring that political accountability by itself could not invalidate a
congressional legislation).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
211. See id. See generally Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty andSubordinacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement FederalLaw?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1995)
(analyzing the dynamics between federalism and congressional commandeering).
212. See Jennifer Modell & Jonathan Feldman, Motor Voter Act Will Survive Printz Challenge,
NAT'L L.J., July 28, 1997, at A16 (rebutting a claim that the Motor Voter Act might be struck down).
213. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl.
1 (providing that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing [sic] Senators").
214. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (stating that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article").
215. See Modell & Feldman, supranote 212, at 16.
216. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997).
217. See id. at 2405 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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state['s] civil service," because "[t]he statute uses the words 'reasonable effort,' 218
words that easily can encompass the consideration of ... time or cost, necessary
to avoid any such result., 219 The inflexibility of the present Supreme Court
decision frustrates "the enactment of a law that Congress believed necessary to
220
solve an important national problem.
In the words of James Madison, the drafter of the Tenth Amendment, to
members of the First Congress: "Interference with the power of the State was no
constitutional criterion of the power of Congress. If the power was not given,
Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, although it should
interfere with the law, or even the Constitution of the States. 22'
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219.
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See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994).
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2405 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
See id.
2 ANNALS OFCONG. 1897 (1791).

